England has long been the odd one out in the UK's devolution era. As the only component nation of the UK without its own political institutions after 1999 it was the 'gaping hole' of the devolution settlement (Hazell 2006: 38). But it was also the 'lion that didn't roar' ( I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national discussion is England. We have heard the voice of Scotland -and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English laws -the socalled West Lothian question -requires a decisive answer.
While the timing of this intervention may have surprised, its logic should not have done. The Conservative Party had, after all, notionally been in favour of 'English votes for English laws' -now known in general shorthand as EVEL -at every UK election since 2001. In 2012 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition then appointed what became known as the McKay Commission to explore how EVEL might be implemented. And prominent individuals like John Redwood on the Conservative backbenches, but also Jon Cruddas and John Denham in the Labour Party, were beginning to argue that their parties should begin to think about England as a distinctive political battleground. They had good reason. As this contribution goes on to show, a distinctive set of English political issues had begun to emerge which underpinned a growing feeling that England should have an institutionalised voice in the UK political system. And that demand for voice had found some kind of advocate in Nigel Farage's UK Independence Party. UKIP, despite the 'UK' in its title, was finding that its anti-establishment appeal resonated especially in England (Jeffery et al 2014: 26-32) . With that UKIP had the potential to shape outcomes in both Labour and Conservative marginals in the 2015 UK election [indeed, although UKIP won only one seat in May 2015, it won well over a hundred second places and around 3.9 million votes mainly in -and in all parts of -England].
While Labour under Ed Miliband did little to respond to this UKIP challenge in England, the Conservative Party did. The September 2014 Scottish referendum gave additional impetus when the surge in support for the Yes campaign in the last few weeks before the referendum led to the 'Vow' to give stronger devolution to Scotland if it remained within the UK. Figures like Redwood and Boris Johnson argued that yet further powers for Scotland were unfair to a neglected England and needed to be balanced by a move towards EVEL, which would remove Scottish MPs from decision-making in the House of Commons that specifically affected England. This Conservative linkage of Scottish devolution and EVEL had a clear tactical logic. The Conservatives' electoral weakness in Scotland -they had one seat to defend in May 2015 -meant they had little to lose from EVEL, unlike Labour or the Scottish National Party. All this formed the backdrop to Cameron's 19 th September announcement.
There followed a failed attempt to set up a cross-party mechanism for exploring EVEL and then, in January 2015 an announcement by the then Leader of the House of Commons, William Hague, of the Conservative Party's own proposals for EVEL. These were taken forward into the Conservative general election manifesto and became part of a package of issues promoted as 'the Conservative Party English Manifesto' in English constituencies, including EVEL, a proposed English rate of income tax, and the so-called 'Carlisle Principle' under which voters in the borderlands of northern England would be protected against the iniquities said to be visited upon them by policies enacted across the border by the Scottish Parliament. All this was reinforced by the use of visual imagery designed to present the Scottish National Party (SNP) -and, by implication, Scotland -as a threat in England: election posters of Ed Miliband tucked into former SNP leader Alex Salmond's breast pocket or as the current SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon's puppet, or of Salmond pickpocketing (we presume) a good citizen of England to fund public spending in Scotland. Here was a concerted effort not just to appeal specifically to English voters, but also to do so by mobilising them against Scotland. It was carried through after the Conservative victory in May 2015 with the introduction of a version of EVEL in an amendment to the rules of procedure of the House of Commons in October 2015. This requires that a majority of the whole House and a majority of MPs for England was needed for any legislation certified by the Speaker as England-only in its territorial reach.
This article explains the logic behind the mobilisation of the Conservative Party in this way in England, and reflects on the trajectory this may be opening up for that party. It does so through an analysis of the findings of the Future of England Survey (FoES) of 2014 (Jeffery et al 2014) . The 2014 FoES 2 was designed to deepen and develop the insights from two earlier FoES surveys (Wyn Jones et al 2012; which had revealed political attitudes in England that were doubly distinctive: they were not shared in other parts of the UK; and they were associated with the strength of English national identity claimed by respondents.
The 2014 survey sought to throw further light on how England is different within the UK, focusing on attitudes towards Scotland in the light of the 2014 referendum, on how England should be governed, and on European integration and immigration. It also explored how far such distinctive views could be seen both as a national 'project' -a set of aspirations resonant across all parts of England and associated clearly with English national identity -but also as a nationalist project amenable to articulation and mobilisation in party politics. The article will explore these questions in turn before returning to the party political dimension of this new English nationalism and the challenges it poses for the Conservative Party.
How is England Different?
England's difference has four features: its 'devo-anxiety' about Scotland's place in the UK; an emerging demand for English self-government; and views on both European integration and immigration which are different from those in Scotland and (less so) Wales.
Devo-anxiety
We coined the term 'devo-anxiety' following the first FoES, conducted in late 2011. There appeared then to be a strong perception in England that devolution had conferred two kinds of advantage on Scotland (and to a lesser extent Wales and less so still Northern Ireland) that were unfair to England: the ability of Scottish MPs to vote in the House of Commons on policy matters in England which are now devolved in Scotland (the so-called West Lothian Question, to which EVEL is presented as an answer); and a long term pattern of higher per capita levels of public spending than in England (Wyn Jones et al 2012: 9-12) .
The unusual context of the Scottish referendum in 2014 enabled us to explore English anxieties about Scotland through the lens of the two possible outcomes of the referendum. On the Yes side, the Scottish Government had set out a prospectus for independence which involved strong, continuing and friendly partnership with the rest of the UK. This was not, on the whole, a prospectus welcomed by English voters. Perhaps the most prominent issue in the independence debate was the ambition of the Scottish Government to continue a currency union with the rest of the UK -an ambition which the coalition Government (and indeed Labour in opposition) explicitly rejected. So did a clear majority -53 per cent -of FoES respondents in 2014, with only 23 per cent in favour of Scotland continuing to use the pound. More disagreed than agreed that the rest of the UK should help secure an independent Scotland's membership of the EU and NATO. Only on the question of maintaining passport-free travel between England and Scotland did respondents -in this case by a resounding majority -agree with the vision the Scottish Government had set out. The general impression, passport-free travel aside, is that people in England would have inclined to a tough line in independence negotiations with Scotland.
In the run-up to the referendum the parties campaigning against independenceConservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat -had each set out separate proposals for additional devolution for Scotland in the event of a No vote. The proposals had considerable common ground around additional tax and welfare devolution. A commitment to pursue this common ground was firmed up in the so-called 'Vow' made by the then party leaders, Cameron, Miliband and Nick Clegg two days before the referendum. The Vow also pledged to maintain the Barnett formula, the mechanism which since the late 1970s has assured higher public spending per head in Scotland than in England. Cameron then reaffirmed the commitments in the Vow in the same statement on 19 September 2014 that announced his ambition to introduce EVEL and with that resolve the West Lothian question.
The 2014 FoES gives clear insight into English attitudes on these issues. On both tax and welfare devolution around forty per cent agreed Scotland should have more powers, with only around a quarter disagreeing. So people in England appeared comfortable with additional devolution for Scotland. And they agreed emphatically -by 62 per cent to 12 per cent -that Scottish MPs should be prevented from voting on laws that apply only to England. But they disagreed emphatically with the implication in the Vow that, by maintaining the Barnett formula, higher levels of public spending in Scotland should be protected: some 56 per cent agreed and just nine per cent disagreed that 'levels of public spending in Scotland should be reduced to levels in the rest of the UK.' There may be a logic here not present in the Vow. On the one hand if Scotland wanted more powers over its own affairs, then fine but it should be prepared to be more self-reliant financially in doing so. On the other, the way England is governed should also become more self-contained, beyond the influence of Scottish MPs and without transfers of (what appear to be understood as) English tax revenues to fund higher spending in Scotland. People in England appeared to want a clearer demarcation of the way Scotland is governed and funded from the way England is governed and funded.
Governing England
The 2014 FoES used a number of different question wordings to explore how the English think they should be governed. In three of them respondents were asked to express preferences for institutional options relative to one another, and in another set of questions were asked for responses to different options one by one. Options were varied in the questions on relative preference, but with three institutional options common to all of them: the status quo; EVEL; and a standalone English Parliament. In each question variant EVEL was the most popular option, clearly ahead of an English Parliament as an alternative to the status quo. And strikingly the maximum level of support attained by the status quo was twenty-five per cent.
This unhappiness with status quo was underlined by the other set of questions asking whether respondents agreed or not with individual institutional changes. Here we asked in turn for respondents' views on EVEL and an English Parliament, alongside two other options which have occasionally been mooted: UK Government ministers for each English region (as was briefly the case in the early 2000s); and a Secretary of State of England. Surprisingly, and perhaps illogically, there was majority support for each of these options. We suspect this underlines the sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo by revealing an appetite for (more or less any) change to the current governing arrangements for England. And once again -by some way -EVEL was the most popular of these institutional options, with 69 per cent agreeing (and just eight per cent disagreeing) it should be introduced.
This combination of dissatisfaction with the status quo and EVEL as the most popular change option challenges received wisdom. This is in part because the main source of data on constitutional attitudes in England prior to the recent FoES surveys, the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey, has yet to offer EVEL as an option to respondents in England, despite it being a policy espoused by a major political party -the Conservatives -for around fifteen years. And that received wisdom is buttressed by a standard question pairing pioneered by BSA and associated surveys which asks and compares which level of government does and which ought to have most influence over how England (and Scotland and Wales) are run. Table One sets out the findings of this pairing from the 2014 FoES.
Table One about here
In Scotland and Wales respondents unambiguously think the UK Government ought to have less influence than it does (with their respective devolved governments stepping in instead). In England -reiterating earlier findings in the BSA -respondents think the UK Government ought to have more influence than now (and the EU less, a point we return to below). This comparison can, but should not be, taken to mean people in England are happy with the status quo. The 2014 FoES also asked respondents to consider a scenario in which 'there were different types of institutions in England' as part of the 'ought' menu of options. This added the options of an English Parliament and elected regional assemblies. Following the Scottish referendum we carried out another survey in England in October 2014 while the Smith Commission was deliberating about the future of Scottish devolution. In this we updated the 'ought' options also to include EVEL (in light of the Prime Minister's 19 September announcement) and city-regions (in light of the 'northern powerhouse' debate on devolution to city-regions in England). The findings are in Table Two , with the different options arranged across five possible levels of government, from local to EU.
Table Two about here
The figures in Table Two, and their comparison with those in Table One , need to be treated with a degree of caution. They present different options at different points in time, and those in Table Two include hypothetical future options and those in Table One currently available options. Nonetheless they signal that preference for the status quo of governing England through UK-level institutions quickly ebbs if other options for governing England are made available, with support for 'most influence' at UK level falling to levels comparable with those in Wales and Scotland in Table One . And among those other options it is striking that England-wide options are the most popular, and that when EVEL is offered it becomes the most favoured of all options. This suggests a dissatisfaction that is about the government of England as a whole and that forms of local and regional devolution are not deemed sufficient to assuage that dissatisfaction.
Europe and Immigration A dissatisfaction about how England is governed is clearly a matter of special concern in England. So, logically, are English concerns about the advantages Scotland is perceived to have relative to England. We turn now to explore whether attitudes to European integration and immigration are also distinctive in England. Debates about the scope of European integration and, more recently, continued EU membership have typically taken the UK as a whole as the unit of analysis. Public attitudes research has not generally sought to explore these questions in as differentiated way across UK nations, and where it has the suggestion has been that there are no significant differences in EU attitudes across the UK nations (e.g. Curtice 2013: 9). Similar assumptions have been made about immigration. The 2014 FoES survey in England was accompanied by parallel surveys in Scotland and Wales designed against this background to identify and account for any national differences within the UK on attitudes to Europe and immigration.
On Europe the finding was that England was a little more Eurosceptical than Wales and significantly more so than in Scotland. Opinion in England was split evenly on the question whether membership of the EU is a 'good thing' or a 'bad thing' (34 per cent to 34 percent, with another 19 per cent saying 'neither' and the rest opting for 'don't know'). In Wales 'good thing' nudged ahead at 35 per cent to 32 per cent thinking the EU as a 'bad thing (with 20 per cent opting for neither). But in Scotland the balance was 43:27 per cent in favour of the EU as a 'good thing' (with 17 per cent opting for neither). On the question of a hypothetical referendum on the UK's EU membership the balance among respondents in England was 40:37 per cent to leave, in Wales a slim margin of 39:35 per cent to stay, and in Scotland a clear margin of 48:32 per cent to stay (with other respondents opting for 'won't vote' and 'don't know' options). A third measure of attitudes to European integration was given in Table One above: the extent to which respondents think the EU 'has most influence' over how the respective nations are run. Here, England is clearly distinct from both Scotland and Wales with 26 per cent believing the EU currently has most influence as compared to four and six per cent respectively. People in England think that the EU is intrusive in the way they are governed, and do so much more than people in Wales and Scotland.
This distinctiveness of England as compared to Wales and, especially, Scotland, is less clear on immigration. The 2014 FoES showed that there were equally strong concerns about immigration in both England and Wales, with concerns in Scotland less pronounced but still considerable. When asked about 'the most important issues facing the country at this time', immigration was behind the economy at second place in England and Wales (chosen respectively by 54 and 51 per cent of respondents). In Scotland immigration was third at a lower but still considerable 38 per cent, behind the economy and, understandably at the time, Scottish independence. When asked about how much, using a 0-10 scale, respondents supported 'restricting immigration into the UK', 44 per cent in England and 46 per cent in Wales opted for point ten on the scale, denoting the strongest level of support for restrictions, as compared with 38 per cent in Scotland. Similarly, and tapping the contemporary association of immigration as a problem of the EU, 67 per cent in both England and Wales agreed that 'the EU has made migration between European countries too easy', with Scotland at a lower but still clear majority of 59 per cent.
An English project?
So, alongside their concerns about Scottish devolution and how England should be governed, respondents in England also had strong concerns about the EU and immigration. The latter were generally close to those held in Wales, though respondents in Scotland occupied a more distinctive position (especially on the EU, less markedly on immigration). The earlier FoES surveys suggested this complex of dissatisfactions was linked in its relationship to English identity: English (as opposed to British) identifiers in England were disproportionately dissatisfied. This is a finding reinforced in two ways by the findings of the 2014 FoES.
First, English identity remains a common denominator of dissatisfaction. One identity measure used in the 2014 FoES was a question which required respondents to choose between an English and a British identity. Those who gave a view were evenly split at 43 per cent English and 43 per cent British. Table Three cross-tabulates the findings of this question with a range of the indicators of dissatisfaction discussed above. In every case English identifiers were around ten points more dissatisfied than the average of all respondents in England. In every case British identifiers were less dissatisfied than average. Feeling English meant feeling disproportionately dissatisfied about England's lot.
Table Three about here
Second, as Table Four confirms, national identity and attitudes on the EU and immigration have different associations in Scotland and Wales as compared to England. We lack an equivalent forced choice identity question for our Scottish and Welsh samples, so use instead the so-called Moreno question which was used in England, Scotland and Wales. The Moreno question plots identity on a five point scale, ranging from 'Only English' (or Scottish or Welsh) at one end and 'Only British' at the other. Table Four combines the 'Only' and 'More than' options either side of the midpoint of the scale and cross tabulates these against the EU and immigration questions in Table Three . We do not find a pattern in Wales and Scotland in which Welsh/Scottish identifiers are more dissatisfied with the EU and immigration than average, as English identifiers are in England. Feeling Scottish in Scotland and Welsh in Wales appears if anything to be associated with less Eurosceptical attitudes and reduced concerns about immigration. So even though English attitudes on Europe and immigration are close to those in Wales (but less so Scotland) in absolute terms, they are distinguished in England by their clear association with English national identity.
Table Four about here
In that sense we can begin to talk about a national 'project' in England in which English national identity is associated with a set of specifically English political attitudes. This sense of a national project is underlined by the absence of strong variation by region within England on the various concerns about Scotland, the institutional recognition of England, the EU and immigration discussed in this article. The final column in Table Three presents the extent of variation in attitudes on these concerns in eight of the nine 'standard' regions in England, with the responses in the last -London -in parenthesis. London does appear to be somewhat different, likely because respondents in London were also rather less English than average in the identity choice they made. But London aside, and with the partial exception of the EU questions, variation across regions is remarkably low. It appears that the English 'project' is one both clearly associated with English national identity and a uniform, nationwide one.
The Party Politics of Englishness Feeling both English and variously concerned about Scotland, the EU, immigration and how England is governed was also associated with patterns of support for particular political parties in the 2014 FoES (Table Five) . Feeling British barely distinguished the supporters of the three established parties -Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat, though UKIP supporters felt significantly less British than average. However, feeling English divided left and right: Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters were less English than average, and Conservative and UKIP supporters more English. On all but one of the other measures in Table Five -Scots MPs voting on English laws -there was a similar left-right divide. Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters were generally less dissatisfied than average (excepting LibDem views on the West Lothian Question). In all cases Conservative and UKIP supporters were more dissatisfied than average and in all cases UKIP supporters were the most dissatisfied.
Table Five about here
The relative closeness of views of Conservative and UKIP supporters is underlined by the vote choice in the 2010 UK election recalled by the UKIP supporters in the 2014 FoES: 42 per cent recalled voting for the Conservatives in 2010, nineteen per cent LibDem and fourteen per cent Labour (with the rest split between 2010 non-voters, UKIP voters and voters for other parties). So Conservatives were not just close in their views to UKIP supporters, but UKIP's support -echoing analysis by Ford and Goodwin (2014: 166-70 ) -drew more on former Conservatives than supporters of any other party. Table Six takes this analysis further in two multinomial logit regressions designed to differentiate the features of groups of party supporters of FoES respondents in 2014. The first model includes demographic factors known to influence party affiliation, along with forced choice English identity. The reference category is Conservative supporters. The significant relationships are marked by asterisks. So Labour supporters (it will not surprise) are distinguished from Conservative supporters by being younger and more female (and UKIP supporters older), while both Labour and UKIP supporters are less likely to be middle class than Conservatives. And both Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters are less English, and UKIP supporters more English than Conservatives.
Table Six about here
Model two tests whether the concerns discussed in this article -on Scotland, English self-government, the EU and immigration -are related to the politicisation of identity in England. What is striking is that here English identity loses its significance in distinguishing Conservative from other supporters, while concerns about Scotland, self-government, the EU and immigration in each case distinguish Labour from Conservative supporters, in three of four cases Liberal Democrat from Conservative supporters, and (in the other direction) UKIP from Conservative supporters on the EU and immigration. The difference between the two models suggests that English identity is an intervening variable which structures political attitudes -and differentiates the supporters of political parties on a left-right axison England's 'national project'.
Conclusion: the Conservative Dilemma
At this point we can return to the issue set out in the opening comments in this article: why David Cameron opened up the English question after the Scottish referendum. The answer is clear enough. Tables Five and Six show that UKIP and Conservative supporters overlap in their attitudes. And there was evidence of a drift of supporters from the Conservative Party to UKIP in the run-up to the 2015 UK election. UKIP's achievement in 2015 -boosting its share of the vote by 9.5 per cent to its best ever general election result of 12.6 per centunderlined the scale of the UKIP threat. It suggested that UKIP was no longer simply garnering 'second order' protest votes at European elections but building a bigger and more stable 'core' support (c.f. Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012) that could stick with the party also in a general election. And it pointed to a capacity for the party to step out of its 'niche' of Euroscepticism (Lynch, Whitaker and Loomes 2012) and mobilise support around other issues including immigration but also what Whitaker and Lynch (2011: 369) called 'dissatisfaction with the political system more broadly'.
FoES 2014 shows that this dissatisfaction had a particular form in England, with a complex of distinctively English political attitudes -what we have called a national projectheld in a fairly uniform way across the whole of England, and held most strongly by those with an English identity. People in England -and English identifiers in particular -felt disadvantaged relative to Scotland, intruded upon by the EU, and deeply concerned by immigration. Their reaction to these 'others' connects with a demand for England's institutional recognition, and EVEL is their top choice. This mix of identity and grievance has a party-political dimension. UKIP supporters appear both very English and very aggrieved. Conservative supporters are also English and aggrieved, though a bit less strongly on both counts. Given, as in Table Six that Englishness shapes the sense of grievance felt in England, an obvious response by the Conservative Party has been to emphasise an English agenda. Getting serious about introducing EVEL following the Scottish referendum and developing an English Manifesto at the 2015 UK election identified England as a distinctive electoral background for the Conservatives. It also marked out a strategy to compete with UKIP on that battleground and stem the drift of Conservatives to UKIP in England. That strategy had obvious short term electoral logic. But it also challenged the longer term foundations of the Conservative Party. Robert Hazell wrote in 2006 that EVEL could be 'impossible to implement in practice' because of difficulties which he saw as 'insuperable at both a technical and a political level' (Hazell 2006: 42) . There are indeed very significant technical challenges, as the Mackay Commission (2013) confirmed. It is interesting what Hazell saw as the insuperable political difficulty. This had to do with what he saw as the unlikelihood of the obvious beneficiary of EVEL -a future Conservative government -ever implementing it, because if they did 'the Conservatives could no longer claim to be unionist, but would have become an English party' (Hazell 2006: 43) .
Indeed. That is the Conservative Party's dilemma. It has an opportunity -a temptation? -to plough further the furrow opened up on 19 September 2014 and articulate a new English nationalism. Given its enduring weakness in Scotland this would be logical enough; it has little in terms of electoral strength at Westminster to lose. But by doing this the Conservatives would undermine their claim to be a party of the union. Are they ready for such a transformative step?
Source: Future of England Survey 2014. 
